Mr. Speaker, the gentleman

from California (Mr. COX) is

right, there are similarities in the two

resolutions. The issue, though, is

whether we are going to emphasize

going together or going it alone. The

difference is whether we are going to

emphasize collective action, trying the

U.N. first, or whether we are going to

give to this President now the right to

act unilaterally, without going back to

this Congress.

We will strengthen the voice of the

American people and we will speak

with one voice more under the Spratt

resolution because there is a division

in this House under the resolution that

has been brought forth on the majority

side. If we want to speak with one

voice, let us say try collective action.

If it works, we will have acted together,

as we did in Bosnia through

NATO. If it does not, Mr. President,

come back here on an expedited basis

and we will act. That is the best chance

for one voice.

A very vital vote here today will be

on the Spratt resolution. I think it is

the wise way to go and is consonant

with where the American people are.

Mr. Speaker, the more one

hears of this debate in Congress and among

the American people, the more puzzling it is

that the approach in the Spratt resolution was

not adopted.

The Spratt Resolution states clearly the

need to act to totally disarm Saddam Hussein

of his weapons of mass destruction.

It authorized the Use of U.S. Armed Forces

within the framework of international collective

action as embodied in U.N. Security Council

resolutions seeking to disarm Iraq and providing

for force by member states to ensure

compliance.

If that collective international effort fails, the

Spratt resolution spelled out an expedited procedure

for the President to seek the authorization

to proceed unilaterally in a war against

Iraq.

So, why not the Spratt resolution?

It would have far more effectively achieved

the goal of the President that we speak today

with one voice.

The approach in the Spratt resolution would

have maximized the chances of success in

disarming Saddam Hussein and minimized the

potential adverse consequences for the U.S.

in going it alone, in terms of reactions throughout

the world, stability in the region, cooperation

in the war against terrorism and in broad

participation in the aftermath of a war in Iraq.

It would keep the pressure on the U.N. to

act, avoiding the inconsistency in the Administration’s

approach of saying to the U.N. ‘‘act,’’

‘‘be relevant,’’ ‘‘hold Iraq to account’’ but potentially

taking it off the hook in advance because

the U.S. will go it alone.

While emphasizing collective action, the

Spratt alternative explicitly did not bind the

U.S. to whatever is done by the U.N., but

leaves the U.S. what it must have, final say

over its policies and actions. We are not

ceding to the U.N. We are leading the world

as the remaining superpower.

So why not Spratt?

Because its emphasis is on achieving collective

action rather than proceeding unilaterally.

The resistance of the Administration to

that approach is consistent with the general

strategy laid out in its new doctrine stated a

few weeks ago, our use of pre-emptive first

strikes in situations short of imminent danger

with only cursory effort to proceed collectively.

It is that very backdrop for the Administration’s

approach on Iraq that should make us all

pause.

Or, because Spratt does state clearly the

objective is total disarmament of all weapons

of mass destruction. While sometimes implying

otherwise, the President’s speech earlier

this week make clear that the Administration

sine qua non is regime change, whatever the

success in disarming Saddam Hussein. That

also must give us pause.

We should not blur these important differences.

These are the reasons that I voted for the

Spratt resolution and opposed the Administration’s

resolution.